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ABSTRACT 
There are currently no-or at best, very limited-industry 
guidelines or requirements on which to quantify the risk associated 
with turbine inspection intervals. Insurance industry data indicate 
that steam turbines are a major machinery loss item with 
underwriters. Thus, there are clear incentives to develop better 
tools within the industry to optimize the overhaul and inspection 
requirements for steam turbines. 
A steam turbine risk assessment project was initiated to develop 
a methodology to address the issue of optimization of overhauls by 
identifying and quantifying the risk associated with maintenance, 
operation, and engineering. Furthermore, this risk is related to the 
economic impact of the decision. 
The methodology followed is an adaptation of ASME Risk­
Based Inspection Guidelines. This process, in principle, has been 
previously applied in the petroleum industry for pressure vessel 
inspection. 
88 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 26TH TURBOMACHINERY SYMPOSIUM 
The process consists of five steps: 
• System definition 
• Qualitative risk assessment 
• Quantitative risk analysis, which includes failure modes, effects, 
and criticality analysis (FMECA) 
• Inspection program identification 
• Economic optimization 
The result is incorporated into a computer model that will permit 
scenarios for individual turbines to be evaluated on a cost-risk­
benefit basis. Beta testing is scheduled to begin in third quarter 
1997. 
INTRODUCTION 
Most machinery engineers are now used to hearing words like 
"the global economy, time value of money, stockholders demand 
for return, data driven, just in time, profit and loss statement, value 
added, ROI," etc. While one may not like it, these terms and the 
functions they represent are part of the world today. Business and 
accounting factors are a part of the machinery business. The impact 
coines from the drive to reduce the costs of operating 
manufacturing facilities while, at the same time, maximizing 
production and minimizing production interruptions (increasing 
availability). 
One of the machinery engineer's functions where this comes to 
a head is in the issue of planning and justifying the maintenance 
overhauls of steam turbines in manufacturing facilities. An 
overhaul of a large turbine (greater than 20,000 hp) will have a cost 
of several $1 OO,OOOs associated with it. The cost of not performing 
the overhauling in time may be a production interruption that often 
falls in the $100,000s to $1,000,000s range, either from an 
unexpected outage or extension of the turnaround to complete 
repairs. 
There are currently no, or at best, very limited industry 
guidelines on which to base turbine inspection and overhaul 
intervals. Vendor recommendations are available but are often very 
conservative, without giving much consideration to the economic 
consequences (costs) of an extra or unnecessary inspection and 
overhaul. There is a trend in the industry to attempt to extend the 
intervals based on cost considerations. 
However, the database of a major underwriter indicates that 
steam turbines are a major machinery loss item for underwriters 
[1]. Further, a recent paper indicated that significant turbine 
mechanical damage could occur that is not readily discernible by 
external inspection techniques [2]. This information indicates that 
there is a risk associated with inappropriate inspection and 
overhaul intervals, where risk is the following relationship. 
Risk = Likelihood of event X Consequence 
However, while there is considerable discussion of risk, 
calculation of the risk with respect to inspection or overhaul 
intervals on turbines does not follow any well defined or agreed 
upon methodologies. The cost of avoiding the risk, i.e. , overhaul or 
maintenance activities, can be calculated pretty accurately in 
financial terms. Determination of the cost of the consequence 
(losses associated with a failure) and determination of the 
likelihood of occurrence are more judgmental. Thus, decisions 
currently tend to be driven very heavily by the cost of the 
inspection and overhaul rather than by an assessment of the 
relative risk. 
There is considerable interest in the industry in being better able 
to evaluate the combined issues of cost of inspection and overhaul 
and the risk of not performing these activities. ASME has 
developed a methodology on risk-based inspection [3, 4]. API has 
been active in this area, particularly in the piping and pressure 
equipment inspection [5]. The basic methodology incorporates 
"risk" that includes both an engineering and fmancial impact into 
the decision process, making it attractive for use in machinery 
inspection and overhaul evaluations. 
Discussed herein are the risk assessment methodology and the 
manner in which it has been adapted for the evaluation and 
analysis of steam turbine inspection and overhauls. 
CURRENT OUTAGE PLANNING FACTORS 
There is general agreement that an outage for a turbine 
dismantle inspection is required periodically. Aside from the 
economic considerations, many reliability issues play an important 
role in determining the intervals at which these outages should 
occur. Factors that are currently utilized in making these decisions 
include time-based intervals, inspection history, operation, 
condition monitoring, and machinery design factors. 
Time-Based Intervals 
Time intervals for major inspection outages may be based on the 
recommendations of the OEM or on calendar years along with rec­
ommendations for specific inspections and normal replacement 
items. OEM outage intervals vary widely and may have a 
mysterious basis, but are usually conservative and may not change 
as technology and design improve over the years. 
These methods are considered conservative approaches to 
outage interval planning. Increased competitiveness and the 
accompanying economic pressures are forcing industry to re­
evaluate the current processes, which may no longer be cost 
effective. 
Inspection History 
A primary means of predicting the condition of a turbine is by 
studying past outage inspection reports. The reports may provide 
details on the as-found condition, damage assessments, and 
repairs, and may define all or part of future outage requirements. 
The data in the report may be the controlling document that 
determines the next outage date. 
Other valuable sources of information are technical publications 
issued by OEMs on a class of turbine. These reports are often 
produced as the result of accumulated inspection histories 
witnessed or reported to the OEMs. They may dictate the 
recommendation for performing an inspection or the actual outage 
scheduling. 
Operation 
The original turbine design criteria and past operation should be 
weighed, along with the unit's current and anticipated mission. 
Primary areas of concern include: 
• Load characteristics: base and cycling 
• Hot and cold startups 
• Procedures (written or other) 
• Ramping rates 
• Overspeed and unscheduled trips 
• Downtime procedures 
• Quality of steam 
The current operation of a turbine may differ from its original 
specifications and from its operation in the past. Changes in the 
operating conditions may cause the turbine duty to be more or less 
severe. This may introduce the requirement to decrease inspection 
or overhaul intervals or may permit increasing them. 
Condition Monitoring 
The availability and use of PC, mainframe technology, and 
process control and monitoring computers has made it possible to 
apply real-time condition monitoring and diagnostic tools. The 
STEAM TURBINE RISK ASSESSMENT-A TOOL TO ASSIST 89 IN OPTIMIZING INSPECTION AND OVERHAULS OF INDUSTRIAL STEAM TURBINES 
amount of monitoring, the type of monitoring, and the analysis of 
the information collected vary from turbine to turbine and 
company to company. Typical characteristics that are monitored 
include: 
• Performance 
• Vibration 
• Oil and lube system performance 
• Steam quality: temperature and pressure 
• Hot running alignment 
• Bearing temperature 
The degree of confidence for operational and outage planning 
may be directly related to the available diagnostics and how the 
information is used to improve daily operations. 
Machinery Design/History 
In the design/history area, the primary factors considered are the 
age (vintage), operating hours, and maintenance and revamp 
procedures for the turbine. Technologies utilized in the design of 
the turbine may depend upon the timeframe when the turbine was 
designed, technologies having changed over the years. 
The approach to outage planning is shown in Figure 1. Careful 
relative weighting of these factors must be applied. Experienced 
machinery personnel will utilize information on all these factors in 
order to make a recommendation on inspection or overhaul 
intervals for a steam turbine. Their recommendations are based on 
their experience and ability to integrate the available data. 
Unfortunately, in many cases, financial considerations may be 
taking precedence over all other factors, since these are the most 
easil)' quantifiable and broadly understandable considerations. 
Figure 1. Outage Planning Factors. 
Team Goals 
Revise 
Assessllllnt 
The primary objective of the steam turbine risk assessment team 
is to develop an effective and easy-to-use software-based tool that 
quantifies risk to permit evaluation of optimum intervals between 
dismantle inspection outages of steam turbine components. This 
computer model will be configured to capture and share a common 
experience base. The contents will be based on sound engineering 
principles and available data and will be geared toward operating 
reliability. The primary economic consequence to be considered is 
the time required to repair/replace a failed component, which can 
be translated into a resultant cost of lost production. 
With modem computer technology, it is relatively easy to build 
a working computer model using readily available hardware and 
off-the-shelf software. The obstacles lie in obtaining accurate and 
complete data on which to base the model since no single database 
contains all the necessary information. The team chose to combine 
model building with information provided by participating 
companies and third parties. The software tool selected must have 
database capabilities to allow for continuous addition of new data 
and improved model performance. 
Development Process 
The. process used to develop the outage interval model is based 
on the steps described in the ASME research report developed by 
a task force of experienced industry members. The research report 
is a five-volume set. Volume 1 [3] is the general document that 
describes the process for "Risk-Based Inspection-Development 
of Guidelines," while Volume 3 [4] pertains to the fossil-fuel utility 
industry. The guidelines recommend a five-step process to rank or 
classify systems, components, or elements. The five-step process 
includes the following: 
• System definition 
• Qualitative risk assessment 
• Quantitative risk analysis that includes failure modes, effects, 
and criticality analysis (FMECA) for ranking 
• Inspection program development 
• Economic optimization 
This process has been utilized previously on a project for utility 
steam turbines. 
Turbine Grouping by Size and Speed 
Because of the design and operating variations in industry steam 
turbines, the first step was to segregate the industrial turbines into 
a number of groups. This was considered necessary, since there 
were a wide variety of industrial turbine applications with design 
and manufacture diversity that would generate categories of 
likelihood and consequence. Five categories based on speed and 
power and one subcategory were identified, as shown in Table 1. 
There was no segregation of condensing and topping turbines. For 
example: 
• Class la turbines might be generator drives. 
• Class I b turbines might drive cracked gas compressor trains in 
ethylene plants. 
• Class 2 turbines might drive large refinery trains like CCU air 
blowers or alkylation refrigeration compressors or large boiler 
feedpumps. 
• Class 3 turbines would drive the majority of compressors in 
refineries or chemical plants. 
• Class 4 turbines would be typical of machines driving 
compressors in hydroprocessing or hydrotreating units. 
• Class 5 turbines would be the API general purpose category of 
drivers for pumps, air compressors, cooling water tower pumps, 
etc. 
Table 1. Classification of Turbines That Will Be Analyzed by Risk 
Assessment Procedures. 
Inlet Steam 
Group Turbine DescriDtlon Horsepower MegaWatts RPM Temperature 
1a Single case driver 20,000 - 100,000 14-70 >3,000 > 950"F 
1 b Single case driver 20,000- 100,000 14-70 >3,000 < 950"F 
2 Single case driver 10,000- 20,000 7-14 < 11,000 
3 Simile case driver < 10,000 <7 < 8,000 
4 High speed < 30,000 < 21 > 8,000 < 950"F 
backpressure 
5 General purpose < 5,000 < 3.5 < 6,000 < 750"F 
System Definition 
After the categories of turbine were identified, a system 
definition was developed. The turbine system definition shown in 
Figure 2 breaks the turbine into components and subcomponents 
for which risk can be more easily and accurately determined. Some 
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of the components in the box were then broken into 
subcomponents. Outside the box are components/systems that are 
still important and may affect the calculation of risk to the turbine, 
but will be handled by means outside those of the defined system. 
( Instnnnentatlon ) 
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Figure 2. Chart Showing the System Definition. 
Qualitative Risk Assessment 
Using the system that was defined, the team developed failure 
mode matrices for each component/subcomponent. Fifteen 
possible general failure modes were identified, based on the 
experience of the team and the literature available to them: fatigue, 
thermal fatigue, erosion, stress corrosion cracking, 
rubbing/distortion, overload, material defect, foreign object 
damage, wear, fretting, cmTosion, electrical discharge, creep, 
fouling, and improper installation. An attempt was made to reach 
the lowest common denominator on the failure modes to avoid 
"double dipping." For example, there are improper installation 
modes that would cause rubbing/distortion. 
Failure modes defined for some of the subcomponents are 
shown in Table 2 as an example. Note that most of the 
subcomponents have more than one possible failure mode. 
Table 2. Examples of Subcomponent Failure Mode Tabulation. 
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1st staae nozzle X X X X X X X 
Blade foils X X X X X X X X X 
Blade roots X X X X X X X X 
Hubs X X X X X X X 
Plua X X X X X 
Rotor X X X X X X X X X 
StationaiV diaohraams X X X X X X X X 
strainers X X X 
Tenons X X X X X X X X X 
Turbine split line X X X X 
Quantitative Risk Analysis 
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The most difficult part of the project is obtaining valid, accurate 
data that identify the likelihood and consequence of failure to be 
used in the analysis process. Proper calculation of component risk 
as a function of likelihood and consequence is critical in the 
ranking process. This permits the identification of those 
components/subcomponents with the highest predicted risk, 
allowing a focused effort on making the prediction of optimum 
time period for turbine outages more manageable. 
There are a number of reliability handbooks that contain failure 
data for steam turbines [6, 7, 8, 9]. However, they are not complete 
in that they do not have complete data on the subcomponent level, 
nor do they have complete data on the range of turbines being 
assessed by the team. In order to address the lack of availability o 
comprehensive reliability data to be used in generatin1 
component/subcomponent failure mode likelihood, the panel o 
experts (eight pi us) generated baseline likelihood-and 
consequence values on the basis of their available hard data 
engineering judgment, and experience. The experts consist o 
individuals from three petroleum/petrochemical companies, tw< 
turbine repair companies, one insurance company, one engineerin1 
consulting firm, and one pulp and paper company. 
Each team member estimated the likelihood (probability) of : 
component/subcomponent failure using the categories as define< 
in Table 3. Twenty years was used as the lifetime of the turbine. Fo 
convenience, categories on a one to seven scale were used t< 
represent the likelihood (probability) and were translated t< 
probabilities (0.000000 l to one) in the program internals. 
Table 3. Definitions Used to Identify Failure Likelihood. 
Category Description Likelihood Range Frequency 
Multiple falluresflncidents per lifetime 1to0.1 3.0E..{)1 Incidents/yea 
Possibly multiple failures/Incidents p.;�r lifetime 0.1 to0.01 3.GE-o2 Incidents/yea 
Possibly occurring once In a lifetime 0.01 to 0.001 3.0E.(I3 Incidents/yea 
Failurollm:ident not likely in a lifetime 0.001 to 0.0001 3.DE-04 lncidents/ye<:� 
Fal!urns/lncidents not Hkety, but poa$lblo In a llfetlme1 0.0001 to 0.000 1 3.0E-05 Incidents/yea 
Falluresllncldents highly unlikely, but possible In a lifetime 0.00001 to 0.000001 3.0E..OO lncidonts!yoa 
Prob3bility of faiJuro/lncJdont ossentlal!y zero 0.000001 to 0.000 001 3.0E-07 Incidents/yea 
There were a total of 332 subcomponent/component failun 
modes evaluated for each turbine category. After the individua 
members generated the.ir estimates or inputted their hard dat: 
(failure rates), the estimated values were analyzed and reviewed b� 
the team in order to reach group consensus. The data wen 
examined using four mathematical functions: the simple average 
standard deviation, mode, and trimean. The mode being the mos 
common value selected by the temn, while trimean was setup tc 
discard the highest and lowest value and then calculate an averagf 
of the remaining values. Several examples of this evaluation an 
shown in Table 4. 
Ji:�ble 4. Ewmple of Team Likelihood Analysis. 
� l1l \'l 1t � :tl .. i � " ,g .I i j j j j j j e j & � � § :1! � � j � .§ '� � � � � � � � � ... :i � Subcomponent Failure Mech. ..: II) ::e "' 
casing erosion 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2.13 0.35 20 2 2.00 2 < 
Disc fatl ue 4 5 5 2 7 6 2 4 4.38 1.77 4.5 4 4.33 2 7 
Stationary dlae_hl"ll!!_ms FOD 2 2 3 2 2 1 1 1.86 0.69 2.0 2 1.80 1 3 
Labyrinth seal.flxed fouling 2 2 5 3 5 3 3.33 1. 37 3.0 2 3.25 2 5 
Strainers corrosion 2 1 3 5 4 4 5 3.43 1.51 4.0 5 3.60 1 5 
The team reviewed the results in order to generate a single dati 
set. For the majority of the datapoints, the mode and trimean wen 
within 0.5 of each other, indicating a strong consistency of th< 
team's opinions. It was decided that the trimean would be usee 
except for a few cases where there were large variations betweer 
trimean and mode that would have to be rationalized. Each of thes< 
was discussed on a case-by-case basis and the team came to 1 
consensus of what value should be used. In most cases, thes< 
variations were the result of a few team members not havin§ 
experience with a particular failure mode in their company'� 
operation. 
The results show a consistency of opinions with the mode anc 
trimean being close except for corrosion of strainers in the abov( 
example. After discussion, it was found that a couple of tearr 
members had experienced problems with strainers in the past 
while others had not. In this case, it was decided to use the trimean 
Upon discussion, it was also found that the probabilities variec 
based on time or operating mode with certain failures more like!) 
occurring during test and startup of the turbine, while others migh1 
be during an extended run. To accommodate this, the tearr 
extended the evaluations to consider the likelihood of up to fom 
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operating categories: at outage, test and startup, normal run, and 
extended run. Each category is briefly described in Table 5. 
Table 5. Description of Operating Mode Categories. 
Operating Category Description Example 
Outage Failures found during an outage Extensive diaphragm erosion discovered 
upon pulling casing 
Test & Startup Failures during test & startup Labyrinth seal rub during startup of a 
unit after an overhaul 
Normal Run Failures before a predetermined Fatigue failure of a turbine blade time 
based inspection interval shroud six 
months after an overhaul 
Extended Run Failures that occur at an age longer than Fatigue failure of a blade root two years 
a known time based Inspection interval beyond the time of the past time based 
or longer than known history of that 
turbine (plant decided to run two extra '" 
Inspection interval 
years) 
The extended run probabilities increased with time past a normal 
run. The failures at the outage come into play only if they extend 
the normal outage. Thus, after taking time into account, there were 
more than 900 subcomponent/failure mode/when-failure-occurs 
probabilities and more than 300 combinations that varied by 
equation for years of extended run. The extended run probabilities 
started with the normal run probabilities. Some values remained 
the same, some varied linearly, and some varied by a power. 
Consequences 
The team, using the following guidelines, determined the 
consequences of a specific component failure: 
• The primary factor to be considered is the cost of lost production 
in days as a result of the time required to repair/replace a failed 
component. 
• The time to repair/replace as used in the model starts when the 
equipment is handed over to maintenance. Thus, it does not include 
time to bring the plant online or product on specification. It was 
realized that the time to bring the unit down and ready for 
maintenance or the time required to get on production once a repair 
is complete may be very significant. However, this will be turbine 
dependent and can be handled with the economic consequences 
outside the model. 
• It is assumed maximum effort is applied to the repair/replace. 
• If a component is typically spared, it will be assumed a spare is 
available and ready to be installed. 
• It was assumed that lost production would overshadow actual 
repair costs. 
The days of lost production were given as a range with a maximum 
and minimum value. 
Risk Assessment 
After the likelihood and consequences are determined, risk for 
failures of critical turbine components are calculated. Risk is 
calculated using the following relationship: Risk = likelihood X 
consequence. The subcomponent/failure mechanism/when-failure­
occurs combinations are then sorted by decreasing risk of each 
combination. Thus, the top item is the highest risk failure. The 
team reviewed this tabulation as a reality check on likelihood and 
consequence. Several iterations were required to reach a point 
where the volume of data "made sense." Typical issues found 
included "double dipping" of a failure mode, mixing likelihood of 
a failure mode with the worst possible consequence, and lack of 
consistency. 
Cumulative risk is then plotted and the subcomponent/failure 
mechanism/when-failure-occurs combinations that generate the 
highest risk are easily identified (Figure 3), allowing a more 
focused analysis on these cumulative risk components/failure 
mode combinations. 
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Figure 3. Example of Subcomponents/Failure Mechanism vs 
Cumulative Risk. (Codes refer to defined failure modes.) 
Review of the data for Group 1 turbines using a 28-day outage, 
found that 90 percent of the total risk comes from 98 
subcomponent/failure mechanism/when-failure-occurs combinations. 
A summary of those results is shown in Table 6. 
Table 6. Tabulation of Failure Distribution. 
% ofTotal Risk 
50% 90% 99.9% 
No. of possible failure combinations 1 6  9 8  3 4 1  
No. of subcomponents o u t  a maximum of 4 4  1 2  2 9  44 
No. of failure mechanisms out  of  15 6 12 1 5  
Percent o f  failures during outage 6.3% 4.1% 2.3% 
Percent of failures during test and startup 37.4% 33.7% 35.5% 
Percent of failures during normal run 56.3% 62.2% 62.2% 
The top 16 combinations that constitute 50 percent of the basic 
risk are shown in the tabulation of Table 7. The highest risk 
component is rubs of the labyrinth seals that occur during test and 
startup. Rankings of relative risk can be changed by many factors, 
which are detailed in the next step. 
Table 7. Tabulation of Top 16 Failure Modes. 
Subcomponent Failure Machanllm When Failure Occurs Rank 
Labyrinth seal fixed/rotating Rub./Distortion Test& Startup 1 
casing Erosion Outage 2 
Labyrinth seal fixed/rotating Rub./Distortion Run 3 
Stator blading (reaction) Fouling Run 4 
Rotor rub./dlstortion Test & Startup 5 
Stationary diaphragms Fouling Run 6 
Shroud/bands Fatigue Run 7 
Blade foils Fouling Run a 
Casing Erosion Run 9 
Blade foils Rub./Distortion Test&Startup 10 
Tenons Fatigue Run 11 
Bushings Fouling Run 12 
Coupling gear teeth Fouling Run 13 
Casing bolting OVerload Test&Startup 14 
Thrust collar OVerload Test&Startup 15 
Turbine split line Improper instal. Test&Startup 16 
Loading Factors 
The next step in the quantitative risk assessment process is the­
application of loading factors that can influence a given likelihood 
of failure and/or consequenGe. For example, the assumption made 
in the development of likelihood and consequence is that a spare 
turbine rotor is available. If there is a situation where a spare is not 
available, the consequence will increase. This adjustment will be 
made in the program via response to a question: 
• Does this turbine have a spare rotor? (Yes or No) 
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• Is that rotor available for immediate installation? (Yes or No) 
The factors are based on questions that look at the turbine 
design/history, operation, maintenance, inspection history, past 
failures, spares, monitoring, etc. These factors are used to select 
weighting factors that influence the likelihood of critical 
component failures and severity of consequence, thus directly 
affecting the overall risk of the turbine and calculated time 
between major inspections. Additional examples of questions used 
to develop loading factors are: 
• Are any blades coated? 
• Are the couplings lubricated grease, lubricated continuous, dry 
disk, or dry diaphragm? 
• Has the turbine experienced any shutdowns due to fouling? 
• Is your vibration monitoring (periodic, continuous, both)? 
• Is the turbine steam from (dedicated boiler, process or dedicated 
waste heat boiler, multiple sources, or external supplier)? 
• Who performs maintenance on the turbine (reliability group, 
trained and experienced turbine plant personnel, trained and 
experienced supervisor with nonspecialized personnel, OEM, 
combination of plant and OEM, or contract personnel)? 
• Is the trip and throttle valve exercised (weekly, monthly, 
quarterly, not exercised)? 
In the survey form, more than 480 possible questions (total 
number of questions asked depends on prior answers when filling 
out the survey but is typically much less than 480) and possibly 
1900 answers are posed to collect information for the analysis that 
can be input and stored. The model program used this input data 
along with the risk and loading factors to calculate the overall risk 
for the turbine. 
Program Output 
On the basis of the input data that are specific to each individual 
turbine, loading factors for that turbine are calculated in the model. 
The likelihood-consequence information that is contained in the 
model evaluates the particular turbine and determines the risk for 
operation of the turbine as a function of time between dismantle 
inspections. Thus, the user has a quantified risk vs inspection 
overhaul interval. In each case, the model provides a tabulation of 
the subcomponent/failure mode combinations that generate the 
risk in order of decreasing importance, i.e. , greatest risk 
component first. In addition, a quantified list of recommendations 
to mitigate the risk is reported, based on the loading factors that 
reduce the greatest contributors to the risk. Inspection outage plans 
then may be tailored to optimize the time between overhauls on the 
basis of acceptable level of risk. 
One of the particularly useful features of this type of computer 
model is the ability to test various strategies to mitigate or manage 
risk and generate quantified results that may be directly compared. 
This may include testing various inspection intervals, various 
overhaul procedures (e.g. , bearing and coupling overhaul vs rotor 
changeout), various condition monitoring techniques (e.g. , 
performance tests to validate fouling), or nonoverhaul procedures 
(e.g. , online washing or steam system cleanup). By utilizing the 
model, an economic assessment of risk reduction and remaining 
risk may be calculated. Judgment will still be required in the final 
evaluation, but it may be augmented considerably by computer 
model predictions. 
Economic Prioritization 
The final step in any risk assessment process is to optimize the 
inspection interval by maximizing the net present value (NPV) of 
the turbine. Plans for the first draft of the cur ent model does not 
include an NPV evaluation stopping with the consequence in terms 
of outage days. The information on the value of outage days is in 
the hands of the individual users. At this time, this final step wil 
be left to those applying the modelling process due to th1 
complexity of applying this user dependent assessment to ; 
multiuser computer model. 
FUTURE PLANS 
Field testing of the model will begin in the early summer o 
1997, with the final version expected to be complete by the fall o 
1997. The model will be updated on a regular basis wit] 
. experience to improve the accuracy of the risk assessment. 
APPLICATION EXPERIENCE 
Since the industrial steam turbine computer model will not b 
complete till the fall of 1997, there have been no risk assessment 
performed as of the date of preparation of this study. It is expecte1 
that the results of the beta tests of this model will follow thos' 
obtained with the project for utility turbines, which developed ; 
risk assessment tool that focused on utility turbine/generator 
greater than 60MW [10]. Applications of that computer mode 
have been performed for 1.5 years. A plot of calculated risk i 
shown in Figure 4 for those evaluations for 35 low-pressur' 
turbines. 
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Figure 4. Risk Distribution of 35 Low Pressure Utility Turbines. 
With the exception of a few units in the very low risk range, rec 
ommendations were generated to reduce risk. The subcomponent 
contributing the highest portions of the overall risk were identified 
ranked, and recommendations made to reduce the risks contribute1 
by these subcomponents (Figures 5 and 6). 
The utility turbine risk assessment project did not consider los 
production as part of its consequence, but only looked at the cos 
to repair/replace the failed component. In the previous case, th• 
highest risk subcomponents for the HP turbine were blade-relate1 
items (tenons, blade foils, and shrouds). The primary cause for th• 
blade subcomponents to be the highest risk subcomponents wer• 
erosion and rubbing problems. This unit was operated under partia 
arc steam admission, which increases the likelihood of fatigu• 
failures. 
As more turbines have been analyzed by the utility turbine risl 
assessment project, the risk ranking has made sense in most case� 
but a review of all of the data, which are in a database, showed . 
few cases where it did not make sense. For example, supercritica 
pressure units were showing better risk for the LP turbines thru 
nonsupercritical units. It was determined that the water/stean 
monitoring section was giving too much risk reduction becaus• 
these units monitor about everything that can be monitored. This i 
needed because, if there is an upset, it will immediately enter th' 
turbine, while nonsupercritical units with steam drums are mor' 
forgiving of upsets and give more reaction time to correct th, 
problem. It was then decided that the loading factors applied to th' 
water/steam monitoring questions should be changed to relate t1 
operating pressure. The constant reality checks being applied to th' 
data allow for continuing improvement of the model. 
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Figure 5. Screenshot of Some Questions for the LP .Turbine in 
Utility Turbine Risk Assessment Project. 
Figure 6. Screenshot Showing an Example of Risk-Ranking of the 
Top 10 Subcomponents in the HP Turbine in Utility Turbine Risk 
Assessment Project. 
The industrial risk assessment project will provide similar risk 
ranking and recommendations to manage or reduce risk. 
Recommendations may be implemented immediately with the unit 
online (e.g., exercise the trip and throttle valve weekly), may 
require a short one-to-two day outage that could be implemented 
when the plant is down for other reasons (e.g., installing additional 
monitoring), or require a major unit overhaul (e.g., upgrade a 
subcomponent or perform a thorough nondestructive examination 
of certain subcomponents). The software will permit "what-if' 
scenarios where the interval between dismantle overhauls can be 
extended and selected recommendations implemented. The risk for 
each scenario can be compared and the optimum case selected by 
the engineer based on company specific economic, operational, 
and technical issues. 
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